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1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have been the 
object of a number of studies for their capacity to create jobs and for the role they 
play as creators of wealth. In market systems, questions of survival, complexity 
and vitality of the corporate environment have required an increasingly deep 
knowledge of organizations as well as the variables or factors which one knows 
as the key drivers of performance.
Several authors have highlighted internal factors which affect corporate 
performance with an emphasis on: bank relationships (Degryse and Ongema, 
2001; Ongema and Smith, 2001), corporate governance (Bhagat and Bolton, 
2008), human resources (Rogoff, Lee and Suh, 2004), marketing Kara,Spillan 
and Deshields, 2005), quality, innovation, technological resources (Donovan, 
1996), cultural values and the systems of information (Tse and Soufani, 2003). 
This study focuses the first two of these.
Difficulties felt by SMEs in obtaining the financial resources needed to finance 
operations and expansion, along with scarcity of access to capital markets has 
led the credit market to become their primary source of financing. The study of 
intermediation by banks is, therefore, particularly pertinent especially to assess 
the contribution of such intermediation to corporate performance (Boot, 2000). 
The importance of the relationships with their creditors is positively related with 
information asymmetry. 
Meanwhile, SMEs have experienced several transformations as a result of: 
i) a growing separation between ownership and management and ii) the opening 
of their capital to external investors. This places them in a new paradigm which 
requires how the firm’s governance affects performance to be assessed. As Denis 
and McConnel (2003) claim this revolves around two great currents of research: 
i) one concerned with the variables related to ownership structure and ii) another 
highlighting more institutional aspects such as those connected to the board and 
the CEO.
Furthermore, a greater involvement of financial entities within firms is 
occurring in Europe, either as creditors and shareholders, or as participants in 
management (Byers, Fields and Fraser, 2008).
The specificities which are inherent to SMEs – in terms of informational 
asymmetry, of the value of the information produced, and of vested interests which 
at times conflict the firm’s administration with its creditors and shareholders’ – 
proffer a determining role to the integrated study of the banking relationships and 
corporate governance so as to understand corporate performance.
The aim of this paper is to systematise at the theoretical level the current state 
of research with regards to the interdependence of bank relationships, corporate 
governance and performance, an area of research which is relevant to SMEs.
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It is organized as follows. Section 2 characterizes the bank relationship, 
identifies the benefits and costs involved and analyses its impact on corporate 
performance. Section 3 reviews the theoretical foundations of corporate governance, 
highlighting control mechanisms, governance models and their relationship to 
corporate performance. Section 4 discusses the relations between the previous 
two dimensions – bank relationships and corporate governance – is analyzed in 
terms of performance. Finally, section 5 provides concluding remarks.
2. BANK RELATIONSHIPS AND PERFORMANCE
The question of the bank relationship is a complex but unavoidable subject 
when one wants to analyse companies’ financial performance insofar as it 
conditions financing.
The bank relationship is generally associated with the information 
relationship which is established between bank and customer (especially the 
credit customer). The relationship influences proposed contractual conditions for 
various banking products and services obtained or to be obtained by the customer. 
Boot (2000, p.10) defines the bank relationship as “the supply of banking/
financial services rendered to the customer (enterprise) by a bank (financial 
intermediary) which invests in collecting specific information (private information) 
to assess its Profitability, taking into consideration multiple interactions held 
over time”. Degryse and Ongena (2007) state that banks as the main creditors 
reduce information asymmetry, signal the quality of the enterprise to the market, 
increase availability of credit and exercise a dual role in disciplining managers 
thereby keeping them from carrying out unviable projects. The information 
exchange which occurs in the bank relationship has a high degree of privacy, 
which stems from the trust established (Groessl and Levratto, 2004). This, in 
turn, results in a learning process which is marked by positive experiences which 
enable the parties of the credit contract to reduce the uncertainty surrounding the 
relationship.
The strength of the bank relationship is measured thus: the duration of the 
relationship, how extensive the services obtained are, and the number of bank 
relationships.
The duration of the relationship, the most widely used measure, is the 
amount of time from the beginning of the relationship. The importance of this 
relationship is based on the fact that it reflects accumulated private information 
over various periods of time by the creditor. This information is very difficult to 
transfer outside of the relationship. According to Ongena and Smith (2001), as 
the relationship is established the credit institution may observe, learn and use 
its customers’ private information which is crucial in celebrating new contracts. 
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For the enterprise, this is synonymous with servicing the debt, the viability of the 
project and the solvency of its promoter.
The second dimension is the amplitude (how extensive the services 
obtained are). Ongena and Smith (2001, p. 452), define this as the amount of 
services the bank offers and the enterprise uses. Interaction with the customer 
on various financial products gives the bank greater accuracy in the information 
obtained and higher efficiency in obtaining it. The bank’s grant of several financial 
products/services enables the bank to introduce more contractual flexibility, set 
pricing policies depending on the different services and learn more about the 
company’s capacity for repayment. Extending banking products may condition 
the concession of credit in distinct ways: i) it increases the information the bank 
has on the enterprise, ii) the bank may dilute its fixed costs in collecting and 
treating information through a wider range of products and services (Borneihm 
and Herbeck, 1998). 
Another variable that is used is the number of simultaneous bank relationships 
the enterprise establishes. Bank relationships may be classified in terms of the 
number of parties involved as bilateral (the enterprise and a bank) and multilateral 
(the enterprise and several banks). For Diamond (1984), bilateral relationships 
give the bank a greater incentive as a creditor to supervise the firm’s activities and 
allow it to eliminate the duplication of vigilance and control. Nevertheless, this 
relationship confers on the bank an informational monopoly which may be used 
for its own benefit, conditioning the firm’s investment decisions (Sharpe, 1990; 
Rajan, 1992). Firms, in turn, anticipating hold up problems have an incentive to 
establish multilateral relationships. 
The bank relationship fosters the production and sharing of information and 
lacks, under many circumstances, a previous evaluation of its credibility. The 
existence of information asymmetry in the bank relationship creates problems, 
the solution of which entails costs, known as agency costs, particularly felt when 
the credit is small or with a tendency to be opaque as is the case of SMEs 
(Psillaki, 1995).
In the credit market, information asymmetries show up when the enterprise 
has private and exclusive information which is difficult to transfer to the creditor. 
This situation allows the enterprise to outline its strategies, causing added 
difficulties for banks to identify different risk levels (Langlais, 1999) among the 
proponents of credit. The result of this is an adverse selection which keeps banks 
from practising active differentiated interest rates and credit contracts, which are 
adjusted to the risk level of the proponents, hinder access to credit for “good” 
enterprises (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
On the other hand, the creditor bank may find it difficult to control the 
enterprise’s behaviour chancing moral hazard. Under these circumstances, 
the bank demands a priori interest rates and higher collateral, as well as more 
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restrictive clauses, particularly felt by SMEs leading them to forego good investment 
opportunities, which compromises their performance (Degryse, Masschelen and 
Mitchell, 2005).
The bank relationship provides benefits insofar as it develops confidentiality, 
improves negotiating flexibility, reduces agency problems and allows an image 
of their reputation to be built and consolidated (Cánovas and Solano, 2006). 
Nevertheless, there are disadvantages, such as, when the benefits of the 
relationship are not equally shared. They stem from the appropriation of benefits 
on the part of the enterprises (the bank has an incentive to concede more credit 
than the real risk the company can afford – soft budgeting problem). They may 
also stem from on the part of the banks (which take advantage of the fact that 
the enterprise is “tied up” in terms of information in order to impose higher prices 
-hold-up problem) (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992).
The capacity for the bank to increase interest rates in the future is conditioned 
by its ability to create change costs which are high enough to keep the enterprise 
from seeking another competitor with more tempting offers, a feat achieved by 
the informational advantage it has, fruit of the relationship (Kim, Kliger and Vale, 
2001; Dunkelberg, Leeds and Scoot, 2003). Even for low change costs the 
possibility of making an adverse selection makes banks, which are external to the 
relationship, reluctant to propose conditions of credit to customers interested in 
that transfer (Vesala, 2007).
The availability the creditor bank shows in investing, collecting and treating 
information is directly linked to the expectation of obtaining benefits. According 
to Sharpe (1990), the bank relationship creates “internal information” which 
allows the bank to assess its prospects for its customers’ future businesses more 
reliably than its competitors. This informational monopoly enables “inside banks” 
to obtain an extraordinary profit on its best customers, insofar as changing banks 
becomes burdensome, by the fact that these profits are not readily observable by 
“outside banks”.
Greenbaum, Kanatas and Venezia, (1989) has a different view. For them, 
the informational monopoly tends to decrease with the consolidation of the 
banking relationship contributing towards minimising the “hold up problem,” 
which provides the bank with an expensive asset of limited duration. Multilateral 
bank relationships contribute towards resolving the “hold up problem” but, on the 
other hand, they make access to credit more difficult, insofar as the relationship 
is undervalued (Besanko and Thakor, 1987). For more opaque enterprises the 
quantity of information obtained is reduced, information asymmetry is more 
significant and the benefits obtained in each relationship are less evident 
(Diamond, 1984; Ongema and Smith, 2000b). 
Information asymmetries tend to decrease over time in the relationship with 
an impact on corporate efficiency, felt through multiple channels. Firstly, a stable 
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relationship allows long-term credit contracts to be entered into, increasing the 
value created. This objective is achieved, for example, by decreasing collateral 
demanded (Berger, Klapper, Peria and Zaidi, 2008), by implementing periodic 
subvention mechanisms for the cost of the loans (Petersen and Rajan, 1995), as 
well as through greater flexibility in contractual terms (Boot et al., 1993). Secondly, 
the information collected by the creditor over time and used later reduces the 
costs of supervision and accompaniment (Boot, Greembaum and Thakor, 1993). 
Thirdly, it reduces the free-rider1 problem insofar as the bank internalises the 
benefits of the investment. Fourthly, bank relationships develop knowledge within 
specific sectors which reinforces the value of the financed projects. Finally, bank 
relationships contribute to economic growth by promoting efficient allocation of 
capital to more profitable projects (Boot and Thakor, 2000). 
The bank relationship confers negotiating power on both parties and recent 
studies are unanimous that close relations provide greater availability of credit. As 
for the impact of these relationships on contractual conditions, interest rates or 
collateral demanded, it is more difficult to reach a consensus as the results have 
been contradictory.
Peterson and Rajan (1994) are the first authors to analyse the impact of 
bank relationships empirically for a sample of SMEs. They found a reduction in 
interest rates for companies which maintain relations with a reduced number of 
institutions even though there is not a significant relationship between duration 
and cost of the debt. In a study on 436 Portuguese microenterprises Matias, 
Serrasqueiro and Costa (2009), found that a longer relationship does not translate 
into better credit conditions. Nevertheless, greater credit concentration accords 
greater availability of credit and lower interest rates. Bonfim, Dai and Franco 
(2009) show that when Portuguese enterprises increase their number of bank 
relationships, cost of financing decreases.
From a different perspective, a set of studies (Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein, 
1993; Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998) assess the manner in which financial 
constraints vary among enterprises in terms of bank relationships. Houston and 
James (2001) conclude that American companies with a bilateral relationship 
have a greater sensitivity of investment to cash-flow and that companies with 
low investment levels are subject to lower financial constraints. In concentrated 
banking markets, such as Germany, Rauterkus (2009) shows that companies in 
financial distress are more likely to be liquidated. 
1 The free-rider problem occurs because of more than one financial intermediary in situations in which the 
company finds itself in financial straits. In this case, the entity which concedes additional credit assumes all 
the additional risk which stems from insolvency, but will possibly enjoy only one part of the profit if there is 
success. Thus, no entity will risk conceding credit. Another interpretation of the free-rider problem is shown 
by Foglia, Laviola and Marullo (1988), according to whom, the presence of various banks reduces the incen-
tive for supervision, since the respective cost will be assumed by just one of them and the benefit will be 
shared by all.
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Empirical research in this area has underscored, nevertheless, that the 
benefits outweigh the costs so that bank relationships create value. To the extent 
that the value generated is shared with the enterprise (through reduced loan 
costs, more flexible contractual terms, etc.), the relationship is equally important 
for the company. 
Studies on the impact of bank relationships on corporate performance are 
summarised in Table 1. 
TABLE 1
The impact of bank relationships on performance
Study Country Period Number Performance 
Measure
Results
of Study Observed
Weinstein and 
Yafeh (1998)
Japan 1977-86 6836 Profits, Sales Not Significant
Kang and Stulz. 
(2000)
Japan 1977-93 154 Investment Bank relationships facilitate 
investment and increase 
value
Agarwall and 
Elston (2001)
Germany 1970-86 1660 Operational 
Results/Sales
Not Significant
Degryse and 
Ongema (2001)
Norway 1979-95 1897 Various 
Measures 
(simultaneous 
equations)
Bilateral relationships 
increase profitability
Limpaphayom and 
Polwitoon (2004)
Thailand 1990-96 1340 Tobin’s Q Bank relationships have a 
positive effect on market 
value
Castelli, Dwyer 
and Hasan (2006)
Italy 1998-00 10764 ROA, ROE, 
Investment / 
Asset, Sales/ 
Asset
The increase in bank 
relationships has a negative 
impact. 
Van Overfelt, 
Annaert and 
Deloof (2006)
Belgium 1905-09 569 Market Value, 
ROA 
Not Significant
Chirinko and 
Elston (2006)
Germany 1965-90 91 EVA Not Significant
Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) found that a close bank relationship does 
not have any influence on the company’s profitability and growth. The authors 
consider this type of relationship charges higher interest rates and, because banks 
are more risk averse than shareholders, they condition the enterprise’s capacity for 
investment. Based on a sample of Japanese enterprises, Kang and Stulz (2000) 
found that bank relationships facilitate investment and increase shareholder value. 
These results contradict previous studies of American enterprises. Degryse and 
Ongena (2001) analysed 235 Norwegian enterprises between 1979 and1995 
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and found that enterprises with bilateral relationships are more profitable. Other 
studies present contrary results. Based on a sample of large German enterprises 
over the period of 1970-86, Agarwal and Elston (2001) state that the bank’s 
influence is not significant for the enterprises’ performance and growth. Chirinco 
and Elston (2006) studied data from 91 German enterprises and found that 
bank relationships have no influence in reducing financial costs or in changing 
profitability. 
3. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE
Taking agency theory as a conceptual starting point, the aim of this section is 
to assess, in the light of existing research, how the various mechanisms of corporate 
governance and how their interaction condition corporate performance. 
The separation between ownership and control causes conflicts of interests 
between investors (shareholders and creditors) and administrators, therein 
lies the need to implement internal and external control mechanisms so as to 
coordinate them as it is impossible to celebrate complete contracts2. (Baysinger 
and Hoskisson, 1990). The investors make financial resources available and 
must be remunerated and the enterprise must implement a set of mechanisms to 
keep some stakeholders from obtaining privileges with regards to others (Prowse, 
1995). The dominant view in the literature on this issue focuses on the conflict 
of interest between investors (owners) and administrators (controllers and users 
of resources) and the inefficiencies which result as a consequence. The absence 
of conflict occurs when ownership and the power of decision reside in one and 
the same person. When that does not happen, the business’s governance and its 
instruments are limited to the relationship which develops between the investors 
and the administrators whose decisions condition the remunerations of the former 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Investors value governance quality in terms of the 
perception of agency conflicts within the firm (Chi and Lee, 2010).
The impossibility of resolving conflicts of interest through celebrating complete 
contracts gives rise to the discretionary directive. Agreements established between 
the administration and the investors generally contemplate the purpose of the 
enterprise’s resources and where the generated returns are to go. 
The problems arising from the discretionary directive mean that mechanisms 
of corporate governance must be established through which investors may 
guarantee returns. These mechanisms, however, do not always work so as to 
2 The complete contract collects all the obligations of those who participate in the contractual relationship, 
under any eventuality that may occur and penalises those who do not comply. Because it is impossible to 
define all contingencies and the costs of drawing up this type of contract, the result is celebrating incomplete 
contracts.
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satisfy the interests of all of the shareholders or so as to guarantee the company’s 
value is maximized. That is why the corporate government associates itself with 
legal instruments and effective control mechanisms in order to safeguard the 
expropriation of minority shareholders (Johnson, Boone, Breach e Friedman, 
2000). Granting resources on the part of investors gives them the right to control 
corporate activities. Nevertheless, the legal protection this gives them is insufficient 
to guarantee returns. The effectiveness of the rights with which the investor may 
count on is conditioned by the predisposition and capacity to use it; so that the 
ownership structure exerts significant influence (Andres, 2008). 
It has been difficult to obtain consensus on the concept of “corporate 
governance,” which is probably a symptom of its complexity and scope. 
Nonetheless, the predominating notion is that there is a sharing of power and 
results among the various parties, whose interests do not always coincide. 
The literature on corporate governance has conferred importance on the 
contractual problems between the shareholders and the directors and to the study 
of mechanisms at the disposition of the investors to control their resources and 
minimize conflicts of interest. Nevertheless, studies carried out on the concentration 
of ownership have given a new focus to agency theory: it moves the principal/agent 
relationship to the connection which is established between majority and minority 
shareholders where the expropriation of “private benefits”3 takes on an overriding 
role, which causes a conflict of interests (Gregoric and Vespro, 2003).
Large corporations are the object of these considerations. However, within 
the framework of corporate finance, SMEs have gained added importance by their 
specificities. Among these, the family nature of the ownership structure and the 
control this gives them are such that the contractual relations established within 
the company, often include family ties. In the first generation, the ownership of 
these companies is often concentrated in the core of the family and direction 
usually falls on the founder. This coincidence between ownership and direction 
reduces agency costs borne by conflicts of interest between the principal and 
the agent. The relationships which are established are very intense and may 
cause externalities which are manifested by greater commitment, trust and loyalty 
among contractual parties. Nevertheless, the relationships become more complex 
as the enterprise grows and are subjected to processes of succession. In this 
type of company agency problems are more difficult to resolve, to the extent that 
the contractual relationships go hand in hand with family relationships (Schulze, 
Libatkin, Dino e Buchholtz, 2001). The source of power in any enterprise, come 
from the rights of control over resources or from information asymmetry (Schulze, 
Libatkin, Dino, 2002). In the family firm there is another source of power which 
3 The “private benefits” result from the majority shareholder using his controlling power to obtain a fraction of 
the residual benefits which spill over from the part to which he is entitled by his capital.
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comes from the fact that the participant is a member of the family which holds 
control. This duality confers a privileged position within the organization giving him 
“private benefits.” Therefore, besides the control mechanisms any organization 
requires, further mechanisms should be implemented so as to regulate family 
relationships.
The literature also shows that the term corporate governance is understood 
differently in different countries. It refers to different people or institutions and 
there are differences in intensity and nature depending on the legal/political system 
(e.g. the legal protection of the investors) (Goergen and Renneboog, 2008). 
Despite the differences, there is a consensus in grouping ownership systems and 
corporate management around two models: i) the Anglo-Saxon model (outsider 
system or market oriented) and ii) the Continental/Japanese (insider system or 
bank oriented). In the latter system, bank market concentration can serve to 
safeguard creditor rights in the absence of stronger legal protections and in this 
way decrease agency costs of debt (González and González, 2008). 
Developing these models has been conditioned by historical, financial and 
legal factors which determine its characteristics (Plihon and Zarlowsky,2002) 
shown in Table 2.
The resolution of conflicts generated by the various company stakeholders 
leads to establishing control mechanisms. The most consensual classification 
allows them to be placed in two groups: one which includes external control 
mechanisms, where market structures predominate, and another known as 
internal control, where incentives rest mainly on elements such as the board of 
directors, ownership structure, indebtedness, dividend policy, stock options,....
External mechanisms play an important role in converging managers’ and 
stockholders’ interests, namely when the internal mechanisms are shown to 
be inadequate limiting the opportunistic behaviour of directors that arise from 
the competition between the different markets in which the enterprise operates 
(Hoskisson and Turk, 1990). Jensen (1993) identifies them and proposes the 
following grouping: i) the human capital market – it calls for the hiring of the 
managers whose value depends on the level of prestige obtained (Fama, 1980); 
ii) the capital market – the mechanism which sets the company’s share price 
thereby reflecting behaviour (diligent/negligent) of the directors (Demsetz, 1983; 
Shivdasani, 1993); iii) the goods and services market – the structure where the 
company fights for survival and satisfies its customers’ needs (Demsetz, 1983); 
iv) the political/legal system – it defines and lays down some of the rules that 
underscore managers’ conduct (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
The lack of efficiency inherent to the various mechanisms of supervision, their 
interrelatedness and the absence of a superior mechanism together with the need 
for various countries to reinforce external and internal control mechanisms has led 
to the creation of an atmosphere that is auspicious to a variety of codes of conduct 
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TABLE 2
Most significant differences between the models of corporate governance
Designation Continental Model Anglo-Saxon Model
Type of control Referential shareholder. Crossed 
participation and pyramid structures
Capital Market
Ownership structure 
and type of 
shareholder
Concentrated
Other companies, families, banks
Dispersed
Individual and institutional investors
Use of capital markets Less developed, lower levels of 
information and transparency
High liquidity and informational 
transparency
Incentives 
and directive 
Remunerations
Remunerations basically fixed and 
less weight on the variable part, 
based on accounting indicators or 
internal indicators
Remunerations fixed and significant 
weight of the variable connected to 
the market
Legal environment Civil Law Common Law
Level of investor 
protection
Greater probability of expropriation of 
the minority shareholder
Greater protection: greater market 
value; greater number of companies 
using the market financing
Level of protection of 
workers’ interests
In the German case, control 
committees are integrated
They are not considered in the 
relationship
or “good corporate governance.” This need, reinforced by privatization policies 
and sales of corporations has meant a considerable increase in shareholders with 
the right to exercise a greater role in the administration of enterprises and in the 
development of internal control mechanisms. 
The importance of internal control mechanisms derives from organizations 
working in a hierarchical structure or chain of governance, which identifies the 
groups which have a legitimate influence on the organization’s objectives (Denis 
and McConnel, 2003). In companies where there is effective separation between 
ownership and control, the owners delegate to the board of directors the right 
of control and to take decisions. In turn, the board then grants executives the 
management of the company so that, later as representatives of the shareholders, 
they supervise the executive team (Andrés, Azofra e Rodriguez, 2001). Thus, 
internal mechanisms from which they may limit the discretionary directive are 
resorted to, such as: the ownership structure in its dual facets – concentration 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Demsetz and Len, 1985) and managers’ participation 
in the capital (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) – the composition of the board 
of directors (Fama, 1980; Vijay and Subhash, 2007), the use of debt and 
remuneration systems (Murphy, 1997).
SMEs are primarily owned by families, so that it is particularly relevant to 
study the role of this ownership structure as a supervisory mechanism (Fernández, 
Fernández and Gómez-Ansón, 1998). Two features individualize the shareholder 
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of a family enterprise: i) maintaining family interests in the long term supervision 
of the company ii) preserving reputation (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Greater 
efficiency is guaranteed by family involvement in the ownership and management 
of the business (Cabrera, Pérez and Garcia, 2001).
The family as a governing structure has advantages both in terms of incentives 
and supervision (Andres, 2008). In terms of incentives the members of the board are 
stimulated to recognize the effects of their decisions on the family’s wealth, making 
the survival of the family enterprise particularly relevant. In terms of supervision, the 
overlap of economic and personal relationships increases the family’s efficiency in 
carrying it out. Wang (2006) highlights that because the incentives for opportunistic 
behaviour in these companies are reduced; putting into practice policies to preserve 
the family reputation and performance in the long term is encouraged. However, 
the family nature of these companies also has disadvantages, leading some authors 
(Galve, 2002; Andres, 2008) to refer to the limited talent pool the family can offer 
as well as the expropriation of small shareholders.
With regards to the relationship between the company’s governance and 
performance, this has focused on two great areas of research: i) one concerned 
with the variables related to ownership structure, and ii) the other highlighting 
the more institutional aspects, examples of which those connected to the board 
of directors and to the CEO (Denis and McConnel, 2003).
Work related to ownership structure has focused on analysing concentration 
of ownership (Parigi and Pelizzon, 2004), the identity of the main shareholder 
(Sheifer and Vishny, 1986; Franks, Mayer e Rossi, 2006) and the participation 
of managers in shareholder structure (Demsetz, 1983; Miguel, Pindado, Torre, 
2004). 
As far as the impact of the concentration of ownership on performance, 
empirical studies carried out have not given definitive conclusions because there 
are contradictory effects in this relationship. If on the one hand, concentration of 
ownership enables greater supervision and an increase in common benefits, on 
the other hand, it enables a reduced number of shareholders to obtain private 
benefits (Holderness, 2003). 
Regarding the influence of the shareholder’s identity on performance, Agrawal 
and Mandelker (1990) support the idea expounded by Shleifer and Vishny (1986) 
for whom the prevalence of large shareholders enables greater control of direction 
and improved performance, especially when the ownership is concentrated in the 
hands of institutional investors. But this empirical evidence is inconclusive; on 
the one hand McConnel and Servaes (1990), Prowse (1990) realise the positive 
effect exercised by institutional control, on the other hand Franks et al. (2006) did 
not find any significant relationship with the value of the enterprise. Conversely, 
Rajan (1992), Hoshi, Kashyap e Scharfstein, (1993), Wiblin and Wood (1999) 
found that institutional concentration effects performance negatively as a result of 
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private benefits obtained and expropriation of the remaining shareholders’ wealth. 
Moreover, Cucculelli and Micucci (2008) say that maintaining management within 
the family has a negative impact on performance.
Table 3 summarises some of the studies which assess the impact of corporate 
governance on corporate performance and the respective findings.
Consider the differences found among the various studies (see, Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Morch et al., 1988, Lee and Ryu, 
2003, among others) on the role ownership by managers plays on performance. 
There is consensus on the idea that the company’s value is higher for low levels 
of internal ownership (market discipline), decreases for intermediate levels 
(opportunistic behaviour) and finally increases once it achieves a critical level of 
ownership (convergence of interests). 
Research on the board of directors has focused on the composition of the 
board itself and its impact on corporate results, highlighting size as a variable 
under study – attested by the number of advisers – and its nature – established by 
the relationship between internal and external advisors (Gabrielsson and Winlud, 
2000, Kanagaretnam, Llobo e Whalen, 2007). 
Nevertheless, the studies are not unanimous as to how these variables 
influence results. If a very significant set of authors (e.g., Eisenberg et al., 1998; 
Wiblin and Wood, 1999; Andrés et al., 2001; Kim et al., 2001) report a positive 
relation between size and the finding or the company’s value, others report a non-
linear relation and mention that the size of the board exerts a positive effect on 
the findings up to a certain point, after which it has a neutral effect (Yermarck, 
1996) or even a negative effect (Fernández et al. 1999). As for the nature of the 
advisors, empirical studies show contradictory findings as for their influence on 
corporate performance. For example, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) show a positive 
relation between the number of external advisors and the company’s market 
value, whereas others do not find significant relations between the participation 
of external advisors and profitability or the company’s market value.
4. BANK RELATIONSHIPS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
 AND PERFORMANCE
The relationship between the banking system and corporate governance 
has been attracting growing interest within the scope of corporate financing as 
the European institutional context is propitious to financial institutions playing 
different roles whether as creditors or shareholders, or as active participants in 
management (Byers et al., 2008). 
This diversity of roles and the effect on the company’s value may occur for 
various reasons. Firstly, as holders of ownership and control, financial institutions 
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TABLE 3
Impact of corporate governance on performance
Study Variable Findings
Prowse (1990) Shareholder identity Institutional control has a positive effect on 
performance
Rosenstein and Wyatt 
(1990)
Nature of advisors There is a positive relation between the number of 
external advisors and the company’s value
Rajan (1992) Shareholder identity Institutional concentration has a negative effect on 
performance
Hoshi et al. (1993) Shareholder identity Institutional concentration has a negative effect on 
performance
Yermarck (1996) Size of the Board of 
Directors
Non-linear relation with a positive effect up to a 
certain value, after which there is a neutral effect
Eisenberg, Sundgreen 
and Wells, (1998)
Size of the Board of 
Directors
Positive relation between the size of the board and 
the company’s value
Wiblin and Wood 
(1999)
Shareholder identity Institutional concentration has a negative effect on 
performance
Fernández et al. (1999) Size of the Board of 
Directors
Negative relation between the size of the board and 
the company’s value
Kim et al. (2001) Size of the Board of 
Directors
Positive relation between the size of the board and 
the company’s value
Bhagat and Black 
(2002)
Nature of advisors There is no evidence of a significant relation between 
the nature of the advisors and the company’s value
Lee and Ruy (2003) Internal ownership Non-linear relation between internal ownership and 
performance
Kumar (2004) Concentration of 
ownership
Over 15% participation in the company’s equity 
effects performance positively
Bhagat and Bolton 
(2008)
Internal ownership; 
Nature of advisors
Positive relation between internal ownership and 
performance. Negative relation between external 
advisors and performance
Bries, Brisley and 
Caboles (2008)
Concentration of 
ownership
Positive relation between concentration of ownership 
and the company’s value due to shareholder 
protection
Marynova and 
Rennebog (2008)
Control Mecanisms Cross-border mergers and acquisitions generate 
synergies with a positive impact on performance
Harford, Mansi and 
Maxwell (2008)
Control Mecanisms Negative relation between shareholder protection and 
performance
Omran, Bolbol and 
Fatheldin (2008)
Concentration of 
ownership; Nature of 
advisors
There is no evidence of a significant relation between 
concentration of ownership the nature of advisors and 
performance
Lin, Zhang and Zhu 
(2009)
Shareholder identity Bank ownership exerts a positive effect on 
performance
Omran (2009) Shareholder identity; 
Concentration of 
ownership; Nature of 
advisors
Private property, concentration of ownership and a 
greater presence of external advisors exert a positive 
effect on performance
Sueyoshi, Goto and 
Omi (2010)
Concentration of 
ownership
Positive relation between concentration of ownership 
and performance
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have strong incentives to exercise greater vigilance over the company’s management 
(Asquith, Gertner e Scharstein, 1994). Operating exclusively as creditor, it ensures 
that the best practices of corporate governance will contractually guarantee 
repayment of the capital and the established remuneration.
Secondly, the participation of these institutions in the equity constitutes 
an important contribution in the creation of long-term value, particularly when 
the company undergoes financial difficulties (Berlin, John e Saunders, 1996). 
Its survival may lead financial institutions to renegotiate the debt turning it into 
capital taking on the role of shareholders. By taking this decision, the financial 
institution will demand that other creditors, if there are any, renegotiate their 
debts. This entire reordering process of liabilities happens when the financial 
institution identifies long-term business opportunities. The combined role of 
shareholder and creditor reduces the tendency to liquidate companies with a 
potential to create value.
Thirdly, internal shareholders tend to expropriate external shareholders. The 
moment the financial institution performs its role as relevant (internal) shareholder 
and creditor (external), its incentives to expropriate the remaining vested interests 
decrease.
Participation by the banking institution in the company’s equity allows it 
to defend the credit it has conceded and to intervene in crises. Participation in 
the company’s equity is a result on the part of the bank to reduce or eliminate 
the problem of replacing assets (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). As for the second 
point, the preoccupation is to try to protect credit that has been conceded and to 
guarantee its repayment. 
In a market context of information asymmetries, the literature has questioned 
the role the bank’s participation plays in corporate performance. Despite finding 
broad consensus in theoretical work which underscores improvements to corporate 
efficiencies, the question of whether this results in greater profitability or it reverts 
back to the bank through expropriating private benefits remains open (Weinstein 
and Yafeh, 1998). 
The interest shown by banks in acquiring/selling off shares may also be 
explained by expectations related to the evolution of the company’s profitability 
resulting exclusively from informational aspects. Long-term bank relationships 
and the position held as a shareholder places the bank in a privileged position in 
terms of access to information. This allows the bank to assess the quality of the 
company and to decide when it should buy/sell its shares, thus obtaining capital 
gains. Studies carried out in the United States prove the benefits for “insiders” when 
they transact the companies themselves and the positive relationship between 
purchase of shares and their future profitability ( Iqbal and Stetty, 2002).
As a conclusion we may state that the presence of banks in companies’ 
ownership structure offer a multifaceted reality where the opportunities and 
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limitations they face are not necessarily symmetric for both sides. The characteristics 
of each country’s legal system, the structure of its financial system, the relative 
weight of the capital market, norms and good banking practices vary. In each 
case there may be significant differences in the effects of the relationship between 
banks and firms. 
The shareholding bank embodies the advantages of being an informed 
investor within the enterprise. It is an active and long-term investment, which 
makes for more efficient supervision in support of its investment. On the other 
hand, it acquires as position of power, which it takes advantage of in order to 
obtain private benefits and extract returns from the enterprise at the expense of 
the other shareholders.
5. CONCLUSION
In contexts marked by the celebration of incomplete contracts, the bank 
relationship and corporate governance play an important role in corporate 
performance. The relationship with the credit institution is particularly relevant 
in banking practices, in which the literature underscores the specificity of the 
banks in collecting and treating information, the creation of close bonds and in 
the difficulty in defining optimum contracts in this context. Furthermore, taking 
agency theory into account it is possible to glimpse the growing importance of the 
various governance mechanisms, the interconnection between them, the difficulty 
in arranging them in a hierarchical order. This is an open topic from which we can 
make multiple recommendations, none of which can be disregarded within the 
scope of corporate performance. 
Consider the broader debate, the findings obtained by existing research are 
inconclusive and suggest that more research is needed in different institutional 
contexts. On the one hand, the studies highlight the fact that the bank relationship 
facilitates access to credit and lowers liquidity constraints. On the other hand, 
it is difficult to reach a consensus on the costs involved as well as impact on 
performance. Recommendations regarding good governance, which have been 
drawn from agency problems and associated costs, are that they should be 
adjusted according to the context in each country. 
Research on the interdependence of the bank relationship, corporate 
governance and performance has been scarce, focused on large enterprises 
and markets and without considering SMEs and their specificities. Therefore, 
this remains an open subject which requires further development in the field of 
empirical research. 
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Resumo
Este trabalho tem por objectivo rever e sistematizar a literatura relativa ao modo como as relações 
bancárias, o governo da empresa e a interdependência que se estabelece entre estas, condicionam o 
desempenho empresarial. Os bancos e as empresas estabelecem relações que permitem superar proble-
mas de assimetria de informação aliviando desse modo as dificuldades sentidas, na obtenção de recursos 
financeiros. Paralelamente, as especificidades que as PME’s encerram, nomeadamente a natureza famil-
iar que a estrutura de propriedade e controlo lhes confere, remetem-nos para o estudo do papel exercido 
pelo governo da empresa e dos diferentes mecanismos de controlo, no cumprimento dos propósitos 
empresariais. Estas dimensões reservam às instituições de crédito, um importante papel de supervisão, 
fruto da informação detida.
Classificação JEL: G30, G32 e G34
Palavras-Chave: Desempenho, Relação Bancária, Governo da Empresa
